Strengthening Enforcement of Interlocking Directorates: A New Frontier in US Antitrust Regulation

As leading business entities navigate legal landscapes, attention must turn to recent developments in US anti-trust enforcement. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have been taking increasingly proactive measures to enforce Section 8 of the Clayton Act, jointly focusing on “interlocking directorates”.

Interlocking directorates occur where one person or an agent of a person sits on the board of two competing companies, potentially creating anti-competitive conflicts of interest. Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits these arrangements, and both the FTC and the DOJ possess authority to enforce this provision.

Last year, the eyes of the industry turned to the DOJ’s Antitrust Division as it dedicated resources to investigate private equity sponsors connected with potential interlocking directorates. It appears that this enforcement trend is not only continuing but accelerating.

Businesses must therefore move beyond simply being aware of this section of the Clayton Act, pivoting instead to a proactive approach in managing potential legal pitfalls in the formation of their boards. To this end, major corporations and law firms should be cognizant of several recent developments that highlight the escalated focus and enforcement from anti-trust agencies.

In a recent enforcement action, notable board member resignations were announced after the Antitrust Division informed certain individuals of the potential illegality of their board memberships due to interlocking directorates. In another instance, a consent agreement with the FTC led to further resignations.

As the scrutiny from antitrust agencies intensifies, the corporate world can expect continued enforcement of this particular legal provision. The breadth of businesses affected is wide, potentially impacting all corporations with interlocking directorate situations, especially those with substantial market shares in their respective sectors.

Should any corporation require more specific details about how the DOJ and FTC have approached this particular aspect of law enforcement, the published case of “Enforcement of ‘Interlocking Directorates’ accelerates with DOJ Announced Resignations and FTC Consent Agreement” provides invaluable insight.

The shifts in regulatory priorities among US antitrust agencies duly reflect the importance of maintaining healthy competition in today’s dynamic markets. In response, businesses must adapt by understanding not only their own board compositions but also the strategic importance of corporate governance from an antitrust perspective.

There is no substitute for proactivity and vigilance in such a high-stakes regulatory environment. With the consistent enforcement of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, it is clear that regulatory compliance will continue to shape the rules of corporate governance in the years ahead.