Tuesday’s session at the Supreme Court delved into basic criminal law principles in the case of McElrath v. Georgia. The case centered around the defendant, Damian McElrath, who was prosecuted for multiple crimes following the fatal stabbing of his adoptive mother, Diane McElrath, in 2012.
The case is noteworthy for its distinct deliberations and gratuitous legal quandaries. During the trial, the jury handed down a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of malice murder while simultaneously finding McElrath guilty but mentally ill on charges of felony murder and aggravated assault. The contradiction in these verdicts has been labeled as “repugnant,” leading to the deferment of both verdicts and approval for a second trial on all counts.
McElrath, drawing on the established double jeopardy protection, contends that a jury’s acquittal of a defendant on specific charges implies the sovereign cannot retry the defendant for the same offense. This fundamental right, he argues, has been infringed upon in his case, calling for the overturning of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision.
In response, Georgia cites its unique right to define its own criminal law and procedural system. The state posits that the twin findings of the jury are so diametrically opposed, they can’t constitute a valid verdict but instead represent an unfinished stage in the trial process. This, they argue, circumvents the application of the double jeopardy rule.
Yet the argument brings with it an ‘Alice in Wonderland’-like abstraction—determining the meaning of the term “verdict” as and when it suits the state’s defense. Is a jury’s announcement of ‘not guilty’ not a verdict unto itself? In this semantic battlefield, the Supreme Court justices may well deem themselves the final arbiter, potentially conferring double jeopardy protection to McElrath’s case.
For detailed coverage of this case, visit SCOTUSblog for the in-depth analysis by Ronald Mann.