The US Supreme Court has this week been hearing oral arguments pertaining to the obstruction of justice charges related to the riots at the US Capitol building on January 6, 2020.
During the arguments, certain justices, notably from the court’s conservative spectrum, demonstrated incredulity towards the government’s expansive interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), the statute under which the accused rioters are being charged. On the other hand, the court’s liberal members appeared to agree with the statute’s interpretation regarding the activities on the day in question.
The law, originally enacted in the wake of the Enron scandal and part of the Corporate Fraud and Accountability Act of 2002, was designed to create a legal deterrent for those intending to destroy or hinder the use of tangible items such as documents or other types of evidence in an official proceeding.
Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar, representing the government, underlined that historically, the law has been put to use in cases where proceedings have been generally impeded. She illustrated this point with instances where an undercover officer’s identity was disclosed, and another case where an ongoing grand jury investigation was revealed to the subject being investigated.
A large part of the arguments commentated on the second segment of § 1512(c) which asserts that any conduct “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so…” is liable. The court expressed particular interest in the term “otherwise” and its potential inclusion of general obstructive conduct toward an official proceeding—a reading that the government avers validates its decision to bring forth the charges.
Justice Roberts, on the contrary, showed skepticism towards this interpretation, suggesting that the second aspect of the law should not be read separately, but in conjunction with the language from the first part that specifically criminalizes obstruction via the destruction of tangible items such as records, documents, or other objects. Jeffrey T. Green, lawyer for petitioner Joseph Fischer, suggested that the statute’s second part was intended only to outlaw other conduct relating to the types of evidence mentioned in the first section.
Significantly, 350 individuals who took part in the infamous Jan. 6 riots have been charged under § 1512(c), including former President Donald Trump, whose legal defense cites presidential immunity against these and other charges. The Supreme Court will hear these arguments next week. If the court were to rule in favor of Fischer, dozens of riot participants could potentially benefit from either new trials or resentencing.