The recent Supreme Court forfeiture ruling in Culley v. Marshall on May 9, while disappointing to some due to the reduction of preliminary hearing rights over forfeiture, may contain the groundwork for a substantial change in constitutional law. This is indicated by a concurring opinion as has been the case in several notable jurisprudence shifts in previous years.
The Constitutional Due Process Clause, a core dispute in Culley v. Marshall, guarantees that life, liberty, or property cannot be seized without due process. “Due process,” however, is an ambiguous term, and its definition has been a subject of contention among courts for decades.
Most courts have relied upon the framework outlined by the Supreme Court in its 1976 judgment, Mathews v. Eldridge. Evaluated aspects, according to this framework, include the private interest implicated by the government’s action, the risk of wrongful deprivation based on the applied procedures, the probable value and impact of additional procedures, and the government’s interests, including the cost and burden of establishing extra processes.
In the context of Culley v. Marshall, the necessity of Mathews’ analysis remained a point of contention. The case United States v. $8,850 in US Currency had earlier resolved that property used in a legal violation could be seized by the government without a prior hearing, provided that a subsequent hearing was held to finalize the forfeiture. The simple question was when that hearing should be held.
Culley v. Marshall could have incorporated preliminary hearings about seizures before forfeitures into the developed Mathews model, thus reaffirming a long-standing Due Process Clause precedent. However, the court did not adopt this approach. Instead, it opted for the rulings of $8,850 and a comparable 1986 case, without employing the Mathews evaluation.
Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas, in concurring opinion, indicate a potential long-term transformation. They note that the Mathews framework is applicable only when the government denies benefits such as disability support, despite the framework’s widespread use by courts in varied “forms of property” cases since its inception.
A proposed limitation of Mathews would denote a significant change, potentially leading to examining the historical context of processes in place when the nation was founded – a ‘history and tradition’ argument – to evaluate legality in cases concerning “private property”. This approach has been used by the court in recent years, but not without controversy.
While the opinion is currently held by just two justices, the majority opinion’s historical investigation suggests a probability that it may influence the court’s doctrine in the foreseeable future. Legal professionals dealing with due process claims may need to consider arguments that Mathews doesn’t apply and make references to founding-era practice, as this could soon become the law.
Read Keith Bradley’s in-depth analysis of the case here.