The Supreme Court will soon deliberate on an issue that has long been a point of contention for school districts and parents of children with disabilities: the standard of proof required in special education discrimination suits. This matter comes to the fore with the case of A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, which represents the ongoing debate over the statutory rights granted to schoolchildren with disabilities by Congress, especially in relation to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and overlapping anti-discrimination statutes, such as the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.
The IDEA mandates that public education systems provide a “free appropriate public education” to children with disabilities, but without fully funded initiatives, a financial and operational strain often manifests between families pushing for more resources and schools striving to balance their budgets. Contrarily, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act broadly prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. However, a pivotal question has emerged in litigation—how can students recover damages for inadequate educational provisions under the grounds of discrimination?
Historically, damages under anti-discrimination statutes are obtainable if “intentional discrimination” can be proven. Many courts have taken the “deliberate indifference” approach, which involves demonstrating that an entity was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of non-compliance with legal obligations—a standard that takes its cue from Supreme Court precedents under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. However, some courts necessitate stricter proof from schoolchildren, demanding evidence of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” beyond mere indifference.
The case of A.J.T., a student with severe epilepsy, spotlights these issues vividly. Her family faced a steep challenge when relocating from Kentucky, where evening instruction was provided to cater to her needs, to Minnesota, where schools limited her to only three hours of daily instruction. Courts found the Minnesota schools violated the IDEA but stopped short of awarding damages, ruling that the alleged “deliberate indifference” did not meet the threshold of “bad faith.” This has incited further discussion about whether such a high burden of proof aligns with legislative intent. Section 1415(l) of the IDEA explicitly forbids any interpretation that would deny additional rights under the discrimination statutes.
Lawyers advocating for A.J.T. argue for consistency in standards applied under the discrimination statutes, aligning with Congress’s evident intent to mirror Title IX frameworks. However, school districts assert that different contexts should demand distinct standards, emphasizing federalism concerns and the need for caution when imposing liabilities on local governments. They urge the Supreme Court to enforce a single rigorous standard, safeguarding local entities from potentially exorbitant legal liabilities under federal statutes.
As the justices prepare to hear arguments, the legal community anticipates thorough questioning, with potential implications for the broader landscape of disability rights and education law.