In the intricate tapestry of American society, justice, democracy, and law intertwine as fundamental pillars. The relationship among these elements is explored by Edward B. Foley in his recurring series on SCOTUSblog, where he illuminates the substantial role of the Supreme Court in navigating these complex interactions.
Justice, Foley posits, is the ultimate objective of social relations, with law serving as the mechanism through which justice is realized. The U.S. Constitution articulates this aim by prioritizing the establishment of justice within its preamble. The task of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, is to ensure that governmental actions align with justice, as seen through amendments like the Fifth and Eighth, which set parameters for just compensation and prohibit cruel or unusual punishments, respectively.
Foley underscores the necessity for the Court to root its principle of justice in the Constitution, citing the 1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland as an instance where the court intervened in what it deemed a gross injustice, despite the absence of explicit constitutional guidance.
This judicial restraint suggests that reasonable disputes should be resolved through democratic measures, with citizens collaboratively shaping the legal landscape either through direct legislation or via representatives. However, the Court’s duty extends to ensuring that laws are born out of democratic processes, as articulated in the 1969 case of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15. This case highlighted the Court’s commitment to scrutinizing the democratic integrity of legislative processes to validate enacted laws.
Yet, as Foley observes, the Court’s modern stance, particularly in the arena of election law, signals a departure from this philosophy. The decision in Rucho v. Common Cause epitomizes this shift, with the Court refraining from adjudicating on partisan gerrymandering, declaring a lack of judicially manageable standards to discern permissible boundaries.
In response to contemporary challenges, Foley suggests a “dormant” elections clause doctrine, akin to the dormant commerce clause, to more effectively preserve democratic processes without judicial overreach. Such a doctrine would empower the Court to invalidate anti-democratic state legislation while ultimately deferring to Congressional authority.
The proposed strategy aims to protect democratic elections, adhering to the constitutional mandate while respecting the institutional limits of judicial intervention. As debates over election law persist, Foley’s elucidation provides an intriguing framework for practitioners keenly observing how American constitutional law evolves to safeguard democracy.