Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s recent publication, “Listening to the Law,” provides a detailed exposition on originalism as a constitutional interpretation framework. Justice Barrett posits that the Constitution, as binding law, should be understood through the language and intent of its original authors rather than contemporary perspectives. This position is outlined in an analysis by Will Baude, observing that the work offers a comprehensive insight for lay persons about the Court.
This perspective comes under scrutiny in the context of Louisiana v. Callais, a case addressing Louisiana’s creation of a majority-Black congressional district under the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court’s reargument focuses on whether this creation contravenes the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. The core issue lies in the intersection of the Shaw v. Reno precedent and originalist interpretation.
The Shaw doctrine, invalidating districts where race predominantly influences their drawing, lacks grounding in the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which did not initially address election laws. This opens a dialogue regarding whether Shaw could align with the Fifteenth Amendment, aimed at ensuring non-racially discriminatory voting rights. However, Shaw‘s premise does not involve vote dilution, only racial segregation in districting.
Justice Barrett, as, potentially, a good originalist, might contend that the doctrine of stare decisis should protect Shaw unless found unworkable. The interpretation clash between Shaw and the Thornburg v. Gingles doctrine under the Voting Rights Act could be a case in point here. This conflict notably puts pressure on states attempting compliance with both racial discrimination and vote dilution standards.
Notably, it appears that to resolve these tensions, a move may be necessary to realign precedence with originalist interpretations of the constitutional text, possibly resolving in recalibrating the Shaw framework to reinforce Congress’s competence in addressing districting within the scope of the Voting Rights Act. The decision in Callais might shape future court approaches, influenced by insights in Barrett’s book and the philosophies it espouses. For more on this discussion, see Edward B. Foley’s analysis on SCOTUSblog.