The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in The Slaughter-House Cases of 1873 is widely regarded as a misinterpretation of the 14th Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause. This clause was originally intended to protect the rights of U.S. citizens from state interference, but the court’s decision narrowly defined it to include only a limited set of federal rights, such as access to seaports, rather than fundamental freedoms. Justice Stephen Field’s dissent in the case argued that the ruling had turned the amendment into “a vain and idle enactment.” His argument emphasized that the right to pursue a lawful occupation without arbitrary government barriers was one of the privileges intended to be safeguarded by the amendment.
In an article by Anastasia Boden for SCOTUSblog, the implications of this ruling are examined in light of recent cases, such as that of Ursula Newell-Davis, who was barred by Louisiana regulators from opening a respite care business despite being well-qualified. This reflects a broader, ongoing discourse on the interpretation of the 14th Amendment. Several justices, including Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, have expressed willingness to reconsider the Slaughter-House ruling, suggesting that a return to the amendment’s original meaning could enhance clarity and predictability in protecting citizens’ rights. However, the Supreme Court continues to rely on the due process clause for incorporating federal rights against states, as seen in modern cases like McDonald v. City of Chicago and Timbs v. Indiana.
This ongoing judicial restraint underscores the long-term consequences of the Slaughter-House ruling, keeping economic liberties and property rights at a lower judicial protection level. Despite this, Field’s dissent remains a critical point of debate as scholars and some members of the judiciary continue to push for a reevaluation of the privileges or immunities clause in light of its intended purpose.