The dynamics of the U.S. Supreme Court are often characterized by complex procedures and an array of acronyms familiar primarily to those well-versed in legal intricacies. One such acronym, “DIG,” short for “dismissed as improvidently granted,” plays a crucial, albeit less publicized, role in the court’s procedural landscape. An article on SCOTUSblog by Stephen Wermiel in the “Nuts and Bolts” series offers an in-depth examination of this particular process.
A “DIG” occurs when the Supreme Court concludes that it was a mistake to agree to hear a case initially. This decision can happen at various stages, often after engaging with briefs and oral arguments. The practice, established as early as 1911 and ongoing as outlined by the Federal Judicial Center, underlines the careful deliberation process the justices undertake.
Reasons for dismissals are varied and do not always come with official explanations. Court observers often cite procedural issues such as standing or mootness, bait-and-switch tactics where the presented arguments differ from those initially granted for review, or a lack of consensus among justices as common triggers for a DIG.
The Supreme Court often dismisses cases infrequently, with recent examples occurring two or three times per term. A notable instance was the dismissal of the Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis, which was dismissed post, oral arguments, due to mootness—a viewpoint contested by Justice Brett Kavanaugh in a rare dissent.
Internally, the process is shrouded in some mystery. Typically, DIGs require a minimum of six votes among the justices, including at least one who originally agreed to hear the case. This procedure involves screening by law clerks, whose initial recommendations can impact whether a case is set for review. The court has mechanisms like additional checks for technical issues before finalizing a review, but as seen in instances like Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank, such safeguards do not always catch every discrepancy.
The implications of a DIG are costly, both in monetary terms—often involving significant legal fees and extensive amicus briefs—and in reputational terms, potentially impacting the credibility of the involved practitioners. These decisions exemplify the court’s stringent gatekeeping role in its approach to judicial review. As Wermiel notes, there is not much to celebrate about DIGs beyond their reminder of the intricate and deliberate nature of Supreme Court adjudications.