In the realm of statutory interpretation, a methodological shift can significantly impact legal outcomes. Historically, the Supreme Court engaged in a purposive approach, considering congressional intent and purpose alongside the statutory text. However, over recent decades, this approach has shifted towards textualism, emphasizing clear linguistic rules and textual evidence over historical intent. This shift is exemplified in cases like FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.
The implications of this shift are profound, as laws drafted under a purposive regime are now interpreted by a court that prefers explicit textual clarity. The FS Credit case questions whether the Investment Company Act of 1940 includes an implied right of action. The court’s approach in similar cases, such as the recent Medina v. Planned Parenthood, showed a preference for unmistakable textual clarity regarding enforceable rights.
This methodological transition presents challenges for Congress, which must legislate in the shadow of shifting interpretive principles. Historically, courts understood and interpreted statutes with a presumption of reasonableness, as seen in cases from the New Deal era up to Justice Scalia’s textualist revolution. The current court, however, imposes what could be termed a “clarity tax” on legislative processes, requiring explicit language that lawmakers of earlier eras may not have anticipated.
This transition is not unprecedented and has occurred in other judicial doctrines, such as deference to agency interpretations under Chevron, now curtailed by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The evolution of severability doctrine also demonstrates this shift, as modern courts reconsider doctrines that previously incorporated legislative intent.
The current court’s focus on how the “ordinary reader” interprets statutes, rather than a dialogue with congressional intent, reflects a broader trend towards textualism. However, this raises questions regarding the interpretation of laws drafted before the modern interpretive era. While the shift to textualism may provide consistency in interpretation moving forward, it also leaves many statutes in a challenging position, interpreted under regimes not envisioned by their drafters.