In the context of a turbulent second term for former President Donald Trump, characterized by an unprecedented expansion of presidential powers and a challenge to the constitutional equilibrium between governmental branches, the limitations of relying solely on the Supreme Court to safeguard American democracy are becoming increasingly apparent. While the court has taken steps—such as halting the unlawful deportation under the Alien Enemies Act and stopping the deployment of the National Guard to Chicago—to counteract certain executive actions, it remains constrained in its ability to curb the broadly presidential overreach rooted in structural issues within the U.S. election system.
Trump’s second term revealed the extent to which a president could command executive agencies, disregarding constitutional protections, which traditional checks and balances, including the judiciary, struggled to mitigate fully. Instances such as the targeted actions against specific media and law firms, coupled with controversial ICE operations, underscore these challenges. As detailed in a thought-provoking exposition by Edward B. Foley on SCOTUSblog, these confrontations highlight the essential need for systematic electoral reforms over expecting judicial interventions.
Foley argues for addressing inherent electoral deficiencies—specifically, the manner in which the U.S. determines presidential elections. The 2024 elections serve as a case in point, where candidate preferences during primaries failed to align with the broader national electorate’s choice, leading to Trump’s win despite indications that Nikki Haley would have been a preferred candidate in a more direct comparison. The circumstance elucidates the concept of the “Condorcet winner,” a candidate who would win a head-to-head competition against each rival, exposing the fragility of current electoral mechanisms in reflecting true majority preferences.
The alternative proposed moves beyond mere reliance on the Supreme Court to protect democratic foundations, toward embracing the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. Bolstered by modifications accommodating Condorcet’s majority preference definition, this compact offers a practical pathway to aligning presidential selection with the electorate’s collective will, paving the way for a democracy resilient against potential autocratic misadventures. By fostering such reforms, as Madison might have championed, the resilience of America’s constitutional republic can be ensured against the specter of authoritarianism.