The federal government’s recent petition for certiorari in
United States v. Carter brings to the forefront a contentious issue
regarding the role of race in Fourth Amendment seizure inquiries. The
petition comes after the Supreme Court’s summary reversal in
District of Columbia v. R.W.
, another case concerning the Fourth Amendment. However, contrary to its
previous argumentation in
Noem v. Vasquez-Perdomo
, the government now seeks a blanket rule deeming race as a non-factor in
reasonable-person analyses in Fourth Amendment cases. According to the
D.C. Court of Appeals
, considering race as part of the totality of the circumstances is crucial for an accurate assessment, acknowledging the unique challenges people of color face when interacting with law enforcement.
This new stance by the government starkly contrasts its previous arguments,
where it claimed that no circumstantial factor could be categorically ruled
out in a Fourth Amendment analysis, including race and ethnicity. Justice
Brett Kavanaugh has also expressed that these factors can indeed be relevant
in assessing whether a peace officer had sufficient cause to stop someone.
The underlying issue at hand is this apparent double standard: allowing race
to serve as a basis for suspicion on the officer’s part, yet deeming it
irrelevant in the context of a citizen’s experience during a police encounter
is disconcerting. Legal scholars and previous court precedents, including
United States v. Mendenhall
, suggest that race does and should play a role in these assessments.
The government’s petition hinges on principles emphasized in cases like
Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard
, tying their argument to equal protection. However, the distinction
between equal protection and Fourth Amendment seizure inquiries complicates
such a direct comparison. The court has previously concluded, within different
contexts, that racial factors are pertinent in determining reasonable
suspicion.
In considering whether to review Carter, the Supreme Court faces a
critical decision that could institutionalize a selective colorblindness,
thereby impacting how race is treated under the Fourth Amendment. The
potential ruling could redefine the legal landscape regarding how race
intersects with constitutional rights. The court’s past decisions
demonstrate that situational context, including race, is relevant to
analyzing police encounters, and a shift away from this precedent
may have broad implications.
Further discussion and coverage on this topic can be found in the original
article on
SCOTUSblog
.