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The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in a 6-3 decision that immigration officers are not obligated to present clear and convincing evidence of a crime involving moral turpitude committed by a returning lawful permanent resident (LPR) before treating them as an applicant for admission. This decision in Blanche v. Lau overturned a prior ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as noted in JURIST.
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, clarified that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not impose such a burden of proof on border officers. Instead, the act permits an LPR to be considered as seeking admission if they have committed certain offenses, such as a crime involving moral turpitude. This pivotal distinction shifts the burden of proof onto the resident regarding admissibility while the government maintains the burden for deportability for residents considered already admitted.
The case that led to this ruling involved Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese national and LPR since 2007, who faced charges of trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey in 2012. Upon returning from China, border officials treated him as seeking admission, a decision later contested but ultimately supported by his guilty plea to the charges, validating the government’s position at his removal hearing.
The Second Circuit had previously vacated the removal order, asserting that border officers required clear and convincing evidence at the border itself. However, the Supreme Court found this requirement absent in the INA’s language, emphasizing that border officers are not meant to bear an enhanced evidentiary burden during initial encounters. The court opted not to resolve whether Lau’s offense inherently qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, deferring that assessment to the Second Circuit.
Dissenting, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, argued that this interpretation offers the government excessive latitude, underscoring potential consequences such as possible detention or parole and shifting the burden of proof to the resident. The dissent raised concerns about due process, emphasizing that the determination should occur at the border rather than relying on after-acquired evidence.
This ruling marks a significant shift in US immigration enforcement, potentially affecting how border officers handle returning LPRs and altering the dynamics of initial admissibility proceedings. The implications for LPRs, along with their legal representatives, highlight an evolving legal framework, steering future immigration policy and judicial interpretations.
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