The Supreme Court of Japan (SCJ), established through the 1947 Constitution, functions with limited original jurisdiction, focusing primarily on appellate oversight. Despite its theoretical parity with Japan’s legislative and executive branches, the SCJ is noted for its conservative approach, rarely overturning laws enacted by the National Diet. Over its approximately 80-year history, the court has declared about ten laws unconstitutional, all of which were national laws. This is in stark contrast to other countries’ constitutional courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court and Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which have overturned significantly more legislation.
Structurally, the SCJ comprises 15 justices who are distributed into three panels, or ‘petty benches,’ of five justices each. These panels handle the bulk of the court’s substantial annual caseload of around 10,000 cases, a figure significantly larger than that of the U.S. Supreme Court. For cases of particular importance, all 15 justices convene in a ‘grand bench.’ Justices are appointed by the emperor upon the cabinet’s recommendation and serve until reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70.
Despite its significant caseload, the SCJ is critiqued for its passivity in constitutional enforcement. Its landmark 1976 decision on electoral malapportionment, which favored rural over urban voters, stands out due to the legislature’s subsequent noncompliance. This reluctance to instigate significant change aligns with its reputation for ‘don’t rock the boat’ conservatism, a legacy of the long-standing political dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This political continuity has permeated the judiciary, restricting the diversity of judicial philosophies.
The SCJ’s internal operations are supported by its unique clerkship system, which draws experienced clerks from the career judiciary. While this system leverages the skill set of the clerks to manage heavy workloads, it also contributes to a homogenized judicial output, reducing the potential for dissent within the court. The clerks, accountable to conservative judicial administrators, often endorse prevailing conservative interpretations of law, occasionally stifling less conservative perspectives.
For further discussion on the SCJ’s dynamics and its comparison to other judicial systems, see the detailed analysis by Professor David S. Law on SCOTUSblog.