In the realm of law, proper attribution holds paramount significance. Judges and lawyers routinely cite statutes, constitutional provisions, and prior cases to substantiate their legal positions. This principle of attribution is central to Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Barbara, where the executive order by former President Donald Trump regarding birthright citizenship was deemed unconstitutional. However, there is a notable absence of a citation that deserves attention, especially within the legal community.
Roberts, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the long-standing interpretation of the 14th Amendment, stating that the citizenship clause is broad and inclusive, covering everyone born on U.S. soil, save for limited exceptions. In rendering this opinion, Roberts underscored the view that citizenship confers “the right to have rights,” likening its significance to a legal foundation for participating in civic life. However, the opinion lacks direct attribution, a point highlighted by his omission to connect his words to those of Chief Justice Earl Warren and philosopher Hannah Arendt, both of whom had previously engaged deeply with this concept in their work.
Earl Warren, in his tenure as Chief Justice, famously described citizenship as no less than “the right to have rights,” emphasizing its fundamental nature. Similarly, in 1951, philosopher Hannah Arendt, in her work “The Origins of Totalitarianism,” articulated the importance of citizenship in a world where rights could be stripped away, leaving individuals, as she characterized, rightless and vulnerable. Distinguished as a German Jew who fled the Nazis, Arendt’s reflections provided a powerful context on the role of citizenship as a protector against dehumanization.
By not acknowledging these historical perspectives, Roberts misses an opportunity to root his legal assessment in a rich context of philosophical and judicial discourse. More crucially, it limits the opinion’s historical depth, thereby undercutting a more comprehensive understanding of citizenship’s critical role in political communities. As Justice Clarence Thomas offers a sprawling dissent, the absence of Arendt’s context weakens Roberts’ ability to frame the opinion against a narrative that addresses the stakes of citizenship deeply grounded in contemporary life—where legal status can equate to survival.
While Roberts’ opinion preserves the fundamental aspects of American citizenship, the lack of citation to well-established ideas raises questions about the interpretative depth of his judgement. In legal battles over citizenship, where the stakes oscillate between life and death, such oversight holds greater consequences than matters of mere academic propriety.