The United States Supreme Court has recently engaged in oral arguments regarding the case of Guerrero v. Johnson, which raises important questions about the applicability of constitutional rules deemed “previously unavailable” in successive habeas petitions. This case centers on Dexter Johnson, a Texas man on death row who argues that, under revised psychiatric standards, he was found to be intellectually disabled and thus cannot be executed under the Eighth Amendment.
The matter at the heart of this case involves the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which largely restricts prisoners from initiating successive federal habeas corpus petitions. However, exceptions exist for claims reliant on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” It is this language and its interpretation that the Court is set to explore.
During the hearings, the legal discourse circled around whether the DSM-5’s revised criteria for intellectual disability, adopted by Texas in 2018, constitutes a “new rule” that was previously unavailable to Johnson. His defense pointed to Atkins v. Virginia, wherein the Supreme Court prohibited the execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities, yet noted that the standards for determining such disabilities had evolved since Johnson’s initial trial.
Notable exchanges occurred among the Justices and Texas Solicitor General William Peterson. Justice Elena Kagan questioned the integration of the DSM into the legal standard for what constitutes an intellectual disability under Atkins. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor highlighted the potential ripeness of a claim in light of changing medical standards, while Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson pointed out the discord in denying Johnson the opportunity to appropriately present his constitutional claim under current standards.
On the other side, Texas argued that changes in diagnostic criteria should not trigger the exception for previously unavailable rules, as articulated by Emily Ferguson from the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, suggesting a potential overreach by the American Psychiatric Association in effectively altering constitutional law without a formal decision by the Court.
The arguments touched upon broader concerns of legal finality and the evolving nature of medical diagnoses. With a decision anticipated by early June next year, this case may shed light on the interpretive latitude afforded under AEDPA and the role evolving psychiatric definitions play in post-conviction review. For the full transcript and more detailed insights from these arguments, refer to SCOTUSblog’s coverage.