As the Supreme Court prepares for arguments in the case Blanche v. Lau this week, the legal community is closely watching how the court will interpret the rights of lawful permanent residents accused of criminal activity in the United States. At the heart of the case is Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese national and a U.S. lawful permanent resident, who became embroiled in legal challenges following his arrest for alleged counterfeiting in New Jersey.
Lau, who has held legal permanent residency status since September 2007, was charged in May 2012 with selling counterfeit Coogi shorts worth nearly $300,000. The charges led to an intersection with U.S. immigration law when Lau returned to the country and was met by immigration officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Initially treated under the paroled status instead of an admitted resident due to the pending criminal case, Lau faced significant immigration complications, eventually pleading guilty to trademark counterfeiting in 2013.
According to the Immigration and Nationality Act, lawful permanent residents typically have reentry rights that should not put their immigration status at risk unless they are involved in a crime of “moral turpitude.” The ambiguity concerning when Lau was classified as inadmissible due to a crime prompted the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings.
Lau’s legal appeal saw the 2nd Circuit vacating his removal order, emphasizing the need for “clear and convincing evidence” of a disqualifying crime when managing the admission status of lawful permanent residents. This decision, however, highlighted a division among U.S. appellate courts on the interpretation of the INA, specifically on the proof required at the point of reentry.
U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer has emphasized the broader impact of the 2nd Circuit’s ruling, arguing that immigration and Customs officers are not equipped to conduct comprehensive investigations at ports of entry and that the 2nd Circuit overstepped judicial review boundaries. According to Sauer, the burden of proof should primarily rest on evidence developed later during removal proceedings, as opposed to requiring an immediate verdict-like decision by immigration officers.
As the case progresses to the Supreme Court, Lau counters that the government is expanding INA beyond its intent by simplifying removal procedures for lawful permanent residents. He argues that immigration officers are capable of evaluating criminal history effectively, challenging the Solicitor General’s rationale.
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case, expected by early July, will likely have significant implications for how lawful permanent residents are treated under U.S. immigration law when criminal allegations arise. For further details, readers can access the full article on SCOTUSblog.